Copyright © 2015-2016 Attila Molnar <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Copyright © 2016 James Wheare <email@example.com>
Unlimited redistribution and modification of this document is allowed provided that the above copyright notice and this permission notice remains intact.
This specification is a work-in-progress and may have major incompatible changes without warning.
This specification may change at any time and we do not recommend implementing it in a production environment.
This is a work-in-progress specification.
Software implementing this work-in-progress specification MUST NOT use the
sts capability name. Instead, implementations SHOULD use the
draft/sts capability name to be interoperable with other software
implementing a compatible work-in-progress version.
The final version of the specification will use an unprefixed capability name.
Strict Transport Security (STS) is a mechanism which allows servers to communicate that complying clients should only connect to them over a secure connection.
The policy is communicated to the client via the STS capability and should be processed by the client at capability negotiation time.
The name of the STS capability is
The value of the capability specifies the duration during which the client MUST only connect to the server securely (using TLS, aka. SSL), and the port number to use for it.
Clients MUST use sufficient certificate verification to ensure the connection is secure without any errors. This may involve validation against a system root certificate bundle or a user-specified trust root.
In compliant server software, this capability MUST be made available as an optional configuration setting. Server administrators may have valid reasons not to enable it.
STARTTLS is a mechanism for upgrading a connection which has started out as a non-secure connection to a secure connection without reconnecting to a different port. This means a server can offer both non-secure and secure connections on the same port for compatible clients at the cost of more complex implementations in both clients and servers.
In practice, switching protocols in the middle of the stream has proven to be complicated enough that only a small number of clients bothered implementing STARTTLS.
This specification expects that servers offer a port that directly services secure connections and it is incompatible with servers that offer secure connections only via STARTTLS on a non-secure port.
tls cap is a hint for clients that secure connection support is
available via STARTTLS.
This specification is an improved solution to that and should be considered a replacement for it for multiple reasons.
tlscap has no such provision.
When enabled, the capability has a REQUIRED value: a comma (
list of tokens. Each token is a key which may have a value attached. If there
is a value attached, the value is separated from the key by a
=. That is,
<key>[=<value>][,<key2>[=<value2>][,<keyN>[=<valueN>]]]. Keys specified in
this document MUST only occur at most once.
Clients MUST ignore every token with a key that they don’t understand.
An STS capability having at least a
duration key expresses an STS policy.
See capability negotiation 3.2 for more information about capabilities with values.
When the client sees the STS capability advertised over a non-secure connection, it MUST first establish a secure connection and confirm that the STS capability is still present.
Once the client has confirmed that the STS capability is indeed offered over
a secure connection, it then MUST only attempt secure connections to the
server from now on until the policy expires (see the
It MUST refuse to connect if a secure connection cannot be established with the
server for any reason during the lifetime of the policy.
However, if the client fails to connect securely for any reason, the connection attempt SHOULD be considered a failure, similar to a network error. The client SHOULD retry the secure connection next time it receives the STS cap with the appropriate keys over a non-secure connection.
If the secure connection succeeds but the STS policy is not present, the client SHOULD continue using the secure connection for that session.
Clients MUST NOT request this capability (
Servers MUST reply with an appropriate
CAP NAK message if a client requests
This key indicates how long from receiving the advertisement clients MUST use a secure connection when connecting to this server. This MUST be specified in seconds as the value of this key and as a single integer without a prefix or suffix.
Servers MUST send this key to securely connected clients. Servers MAY send this key to non-securely connected clients, but it will be ignored.
If the client receives the
duration key on a non-secure connection, it is
invalid and MUST be ignored.
Clients MUST reset the duration “time to live” every time they receive a valid
policy advertisement having a
duration key from the server.
A duration of 0 means the policy expires immediately. This method MAY be used
by servers to remove a previously set policy. Clients MUST NOT remove a policy
if the server disables the capability with
This key indicates the port number that clients can use when connecting over TLS. This key’s value MUST be a single port number.
If the client is not already connected securely, it MUST close the insecure connection and reconnect securely on the stated port.
Servers MUST send this key to non-securely connected clients. Servers MAY send this key to securely connected clients, but it will be ignored.
IRC connections may be long-lived. Connections lasting for more than a month are not uncommon. When a client has successfully learned the STS policy for a server but it does not reconnect for a long period of time it may think the policy expired, even if in fact the same policy is still advertised by the server.
The client MUST reschedule the expiration on disconnection. The new expiration is calculated from the current policy as last advertised by the server and the current time.
This section is non-normative.
For increased user protection and more advanced management of cached STS policies, clients should consider implementing features such as the following:
The client may choose to periodically reschedule the expiration of the policy while connected as well, to protect against sudden power outages, for example.
An appropriate period for rescheduling expiration while connected might depend on the length of the policy expiration. For instance, longer expiry times might warrant less frequent rescheduling.
If a client fails to establish a secure connection for any reason to a server with which an STS policy has been stored, there should be no immediate user recourse. For example the user should not be presented with a dialog that allows them to proceed with the connection. A failure to establish a secure connection should be treated similarly to a server error that the user is unable to do anything about except retrying at a later time.
This is to ensure that it is not possible to fool users into allowing a man-in-the-middle attack.
Clients may allow users to explicitly define an STS policy for a given host, before any interaction with the host. This could help prevent a “Bootstrap MITM vulnerability” as discussed in General security considerations.
As further protection against bootstrap MITM vulnerabilities, clients may choose to include a pre-loaded list of known hosts with STS policies. Such lists should be compiled on an opt-in basis, by request of IRC network administrators. Hosts should be verified to be correctly advertising an STS policy before inclusion.
Clients should consider how their release upgrade cycle compares to server policy expiry times when compiling pre-loaded lists. Implementations should be able to provide updates to user installed pre-load lists within an appropriate time frame of host policies expiring.
Clients should allow users to delete cached STS policies on a per-host basis, in case a server’s policy is accidentally or maliciously injected on a secure connection.
Clients may additionally provide the ability to reject STS policies on a per-host basis as an additional mitigation.
These features should be made available very carefully in both the user interface and security senses. Deleting or rejecting a cache entry for a known STS host should be a very deliberate and well-considered act – it shouldn’t be something that users get used to doing as a matter of course: e.g., just “clicking through” in order to get work done. In other words, these features should not violate the “no immediate user recourse” section.
This section is non-normative.
IRCd configurations and network administrators should consider whether expiry times represent a constant value into the future, or a fixed expiry time.
Constant values into the future can be achieved by a configured number of seconds being
sent in the
duration key on each connection attempt.
Servers implementors should be aware that fixed expiry times may not be precisely guaranteed in the case where clients reschedule policy expiry on disconnect.
Fixed expiry times will involve a dynamic
duration value being calculated on each
Which approach to take will depend on a number of considerations. For example, a server may wish their STS Policy to expire at the same time as their domain certificate. Alternatively, a server may wish their STS policy to last for as long as possible.
Server implementations should consider using a value of
duration=0 in their example
configurations. This will require server administrators to deliberately set an expiry
according to their specific needs rather than an arbitrary generic value.
The STS policy is imposed for an entire domain name. This means that mixing STS-utilizing and non-secure IRC servers on the same domain name or running multiple STS-utilizing IRC servers on the same domain name may result in some clients only being able to connect to a single IRC server on that domain name, depending on which IRC server they connected to first.
For example, a single server may run a production IRC server which advertises an STS policy and another, unrelated IRC server on a different port for testing purposes which does not offer secure connections.
In this case, to allow clients to connect to both IRC servers the non-secure IRC server may be offered at a different domain name, for example a subdomain.
It’s possible for an attacker to strip the STS
port value from an initial connection
established via an insecure connection, before the policy has been cached by the client.
This represents a Bootstrap MITM (man-in-the-middle) vulnerability.
Clients may choose to mitigate this risk by implementing features such as user-declared and pre-loaded STS policies, as described in the “Client implementation considerations” section.
It is possible that a client successfully receives the STS policy from a server but later on attackers begin to block all secure connection attempts from the client to the server until the policy expires. At that time, the client will revert back to a non-secure connection. Servers SHOULD advertise a long enough duration which makes this scenario less likely to happen.
Servers should choose an appropriate
duration value according with reference to
the “Server implementation considerations” section to avoid inadvertent expiry issues.
STS could result in a Denial of Service (DoS) on IRC servers in a number of ways. Some non-exhaustive examples include:
An attacker could inject an STS policy into an insecure connection that causes clients to reconnect on a secure port under the attacker’s control. If this secure connection suceeds, an unwanted policy will be set for the host and persist in clients even after an administrator has regained control of their server. This can be mitigated in clients by allowing for STS policy rejection as described in the “Client implementation considerations” section.
A 3rd party host with DNS pointing to an STS-enabled host, where the 3rd party isn’t listed on the server’s certificate. This configuration would fail certificate validation even without STS, but users may be relying on it for non-secure access.
An attacker could trick a user into declaring a manual STS policy in their client.
A server administrator may configure an STS policy for a server whose secure capabilities
are later disabled. For example, their host certificate is allowed to expire without being
renewed, or is deemed insecure by newly exposed weak hash algorithms. Care must be taken when
choosing policy expiry times, as discussed in “Server implementation considerations”, in
particular when hosts are included in client pre-load policy lists. The ability to set a
duration=0 value at any time to revoke an STS policy is also a useful protection against
These issues are not vulnerabilities with STS as such, but rather compound configuration errors, or issues involving vulnerable systems exploited by other means.
Server tells a client connecting non-securely to connect securely on port 6697.
Client: CAP LS 302 Server: CAP * LS :draft/sts=port=6697
After the exchange, the client disconnects and reconnects securely to the same server on port 6697 and proceeds as it normally would.
Server tells a client that is already connected securely that the client must only use secure connections for roughly 6 months.
Client: CAP LS 302 Server: CAP * LS :draft/sts=duration=15552000
Until the policy expires:
Server tells a client that is connected non-securely that the client must use secure connections for roughly 6 months. There is no port advertised.
Client: CAP LS 302 Server: CAP * LS :draft/sts=duration=15552000
The client ignores this because it received the STS policy over a non-secure
connection and the STS cap contains no token with key
Server tells a client that is already connected securely that the client must use secure connections for roughly a year, but the value of the STS capability also contains some tokens whose keys the client does not understand.
Client: CAP LS 302 Server: CAP * LS :draft/sts=unknown,duration=31536000,foo=bar
The client ignores the keys it does not understand and until the policy expires:
Server tells a client that is already connected securely to remove the STS policy now.
Client: CAP LS 302 Server: CAP * LS :draft/sts=duration=0
If the client has any STS policy stored for the server it clears the policy. Future connections should use whatever settings (port, secure/non-secure) the client used before it received the STS policy.
A client securely connects to a server, which advertises an STS policy.
Client: CAP LS 302 Server: CAP * LS :multi-prefix draft/sts=duration=2592000
The client saves the policy and notes that it will become expired in 2592000 seconds (roughly one month). It completes registration, then proceeds as usual.
After 48 hours, the client disconnects.
Client: QUIT :Bye
According to the client’s last information at the time of disconnection the policy is still valid, so it reschedules the expiration to occur in 2592000 seconds from the time of disconnection.