Copyright © 2013-2015 Mantas Mikulėnas <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Unlimited redistribution and modification of this document is allowed provided that the above copyright notice and this permission notice remains intact.
This mechanism has been deemed unsafe and has been deprecated. Please refer to the SASL Mechanisms page for mechanisms that the IRCv3 WG now recommends.
This specification has been deprecated. We do not recommend implementing this specification or the features described here.
This specification documents the
DH-AES SASL mechanism currently implemented
by some IRC clients and services.
The mechanism is non-standard, and specific to IRC software. It uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange to choose a shared encryption key, which is then used to encrypt the password sent to the server.
The mechanism does not authenticate the server, and is considered insecure against active MITM attacks. Therefore it may give a false sense of security to users. It does however have improvements over DH-BLOWFISH.
The mechanism does not allow an authorization identity to be specified.
The server starts by sending a challenge containing the DH parameters p, g, and the server’s public key, each serialized as two bytes containing the parameter’s length (network byte order), followed by the parameter itself as an OpenSSL bignum.
message = bignum(p) . bignum(g) . bignum(pub_key)
The client computes the shared key from the received DH parameters, and uses it to encrypt the credentials using AES-128 in CBC mode with a random IV.
The credentials consist of username (authentication identity) and password concatenated together; each item must be encoded as UTF-8 and null-terminated. The result is then padded to 16 bytes.
The client then sends the response consisting of its own DH public key, the IV, and the encrypted credentials. Again, the public key is serialized as two bytes containing the length, followed by the key itself as a bignum.
raw_credentials = pad(16, cstring(authn_id) . cstring(password)) enc_credentials = aes128_cbc[shared_key, iv](raw_credentials) message = bignum(pub_key) . iv . enc_credentials
The server computes the same shared key from the DH parameters and client’s public key, and uses it to decrypt the username and password.